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Legal Conceptions of Equality in the
Genomic Age
Mark A. Rothstein*
Theodosius Dobzhansky was one of the leading population
geneticists of the twentieth century. Born in 1900 in a small town
in the Ukraine, 1 he came to the United States in 1927 on a
fellowship to study with Thomas Hunt Morgan at Columbia
University-another giant in genetics who is best known for his
work with Drosophila melanogaster (fruit flies). 2 Dobzhansky
remained in the United States the rest of his life, researching,
teaching, and writing about genetics. Dobzhansky's greatest,
enduring contribution to genetics is his work (along with such
luminaries as R.A. Fisher, J.B.S. Haldane, Julian Huxley, Ernst
Mayr, and Sewall Wright) in formulating the Modern Synthesis of
Evolutionary Theory. 3
The Modern Synthesis integrated
Darwinian principles of natural selection with Mendelian
principles of inheritance to establish the evolutionary foundations
4
of modern genetics.
Dobzhansky is notable today as much for his social
commentary as for his technical scientific writings. Four of the
themes in Dobzhansky's writing on genetics and equality are
especially relevant to this Article. They provide a way to assess
the implications for notions of equality when genetic technologies
are used in tort, employment discrimination, and occupational
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indebted to the following individuals for their helpful comments on earlier drafts:
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Anderlik Majumder, Serge Martinez, Nancy Potter, Laura Rothstein, and Bob
Stenger. Faculty participants at a workshop at the Howard University School of
Law also provided valuable input on themes in this article. Special research
support was provided by Will Hilyerd, Faculty Services Librarian, and his staff at
the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville.
1. Francisco J. Ayala & Walter M. Fitch, Genetics and the Origin of Species:
An Introduction, 94 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 7691, 7692 (1997).
2. See id. at 7692 93.
3. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 503
28 (2002); MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION 13-17 (2d ed.
DOBZHANSKY, GENETICS AND THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES

4. See GOULD, supra note 3, at 503.

1996).

(1937).

See THEODOSIUS
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health law. The three illustrative areas reflect common law,
statutory, and regulatory approaches to individual differences.
Dobzhansky's writings also suggest a way of considering societal
notions of equality more generally.
This Article proposes a new approach to analyzing the effects
5
of individual genetic variation on conceptions of equality. It
ultimately finds the current public policy approach of ignoring
individual genetic variation increasingly untenable from a
theoretical, scientific, and practical standpoint. A new approach to
equality based on the recognition of individual genetic variation is
better calculated to achieve respect, dignity, and equality of
opportunity for all individuals.
I.

Dobzhansky's Insights

During the 1920s and 1930s, eugenics 6 was a dominant and
widely-supported political application of what was then considered
7
the sound genetic principle of improving the nation's gene pool.
In the United States, concerns about "diluting" the population
stock with "genetically inferior" immigrants led to enactment of
the Johnson-Lodge Immigration Restriction Act of 1924,8 which
greatly reduced the number of lawful immigrants and virtually
excluded additional immigration from Southern and Eastern

5. Genetics is the scientific study of heredity. Because of technological
limitations, scientists tended to determine the locus and function of one gene at a
time. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE GENOME:
THE CHALLENGE TO EQUALITY 9-19 (1998). By contrast, the new field of genomics
uses genome-wide analytical tools to study the effect of multiple genes, proteins,
and other gene products on biological processes. Id. Genomics deals with a larger
set of information. Id. This Article uses both terms because genomics is expanding
the amount and nature of available genetic information.
6. In the early twentieth century, eugenics, a term coined by Francis Galton in
the late 1800s meaning "well born," became a social movement of individuals
committed to betterment of humankind by "encouraging" those with superior
physical and mental endowments to reproduce and "discouraging" those with
inferior endowments to refrain from reproducing. See DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE
NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY iv (1985). These
two strategies are termed "positive" and "negative" eugenics. Id. at 85. As
governments became involved in establishing eugenics as state policies, the degree
of compulsion in eugenics programs increased, eventually leading to breeding
programs, compulsory sterilization of "unfit" individuals, and genocide. There is a
vast literature on eugenics. See generally id.; BENNO MULLER-HILL, MURDEROUS
SCIENCE: ELIMINATION BY SCIENTIFIC SELECTION OF JEWS, GYPSIES, AND OTHERS,

GERMANY 1933-1945 (George R. Fraser, trans.) (1988); ROBERT N. PROCTOR, RACIAL
HYGIENE: MEDICINE UNDER THE NAZIS (1988).

7. See ALLAN CHASE, THE LEGACY OF MALTHUS: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE
NEW SCIENTIFIC RACISM 15 17 (1975).
8. 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (repealed 1952).
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Europe. 9
In order to improve the nation's gene pool, state governments
engaged in compulsory sterilization of individuals considered
genetically "defective."10 The
Supreme
Court upheld the
constitutionality of state eugenic sterilization laws in 1927 in the
infamous case of Buck v. Bell." Between 1912 and 1931, twentyeight states enacted eugenic sterilization laws, ultimately
resulting in the forced sterilization of an estimated 60,000 people
in the United States. 12 In Europe, every country except England
also passed eugenic sterilization laws.
By the 1930s, Nazi
Germany had started down the insidious path of positive and
13
negative eugenics that would culminate in the Holocaust.
Many of the scientists engaged in genetics research in the
first half of the twentieth century were astonishingly oblivious to

or silent about the potential for extraordinarily destructive
14
applications of unproven and politically-inspired genetic theories.
15
One prominent exception was Dobzhansky. Beginning in the
1940s and continuing until his death in 1975,16 Dobzhansky wrote
passionately about the social implications of genetics, particularly
17
with regard to the effect of genetics on conceptions of equality.

9. The Act's stated purpose was "to limit the immigration of aliens into the
United States." Id.
10. See Philip R. Reilly, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization Laws, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 204, 204-08 (Thomas H.

Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds. 2000).
11. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
12. J. DAVID SMITH, THE EUGENIC ASSAULT ON AMERICA 6 (1993); see Paul A.
Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ??? Are Enough, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191, 202 (2003); Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No
Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 31 (1985).
13. See generally THE WELLBORN SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN GERMANY, FRANCE,
BRAZIL, & RUSSIA (Mark B. Adams ed., 1990).

14. See CHASE, supra note 7.
15. Another leading scientist who advocated for the fundamental equality of all
humans, although not specifically in the context of genetics, was Ashley Montagu, a
leading anthropologist and Dobzhansky's friend and Columbia University
colleague. See, e.g., M.F. ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE
FALLACY OF RACE (1942). Among other collaborations, they coauthored the
following article: Theodosius Dobzhansky & M.F. Ashley Montagu, Natural
Selection and the Mental Capacities of Mankind, 105 SCIENCE 587 (1947). The
author and social commentator Gilbert Keith (G.K.) Chesterton presented a
powerful and prescient critique of eugenics as early as 1922 in G.K. CHESTERTON,
EUGENICS AND OTHER EVILS:
ORGANIZED SOCIETY (1922).

AN

ARGUMENT AGAINST

THE

SCIENTIFICALLY

16. Costas B. Krimbus, Dobzhansky's Wlorldview, in THE EVOLUTION OF
THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY 179, 186 (Mark B. Adams ed., 1994).
17. See, e.g., Theodosius Dobzhansky, Genetics and Equality, 137 SCIENCE 112
(1962).
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Four of the themes in the work of Dobzhansky are applicable
to modern legal conceptions of equality.
First, Dobzhansky
emphasized that inequality of opportunity is a waste of human
18
capital.
The cultural flowering of ancient Greece may have been
impossible without slave labor, and the social graces of baroque
Europe may have been impossible without the toil of its
peasants and artisans. But to waste human resources is
inexcusable in a world of technology able to produce enough
and to spare. 19
Thus, Dobzhansky opposed the notion that genetics operates to
select social classes.20 Even though he rejected genetic
determinism, Dobzhansky recognized that, ultimately, decisions
21
about societal conceptions of equality are political decisions.
Second, Dobzhansky criticized the opposing assumptions
about the role of genetics and equality.2 2 On the one hand, many
who believe in genetic "predestination," whom Dobzhansky called
"conservatives," asserted that differences in genetic endowments
made "some of us ...inept, some clever and others stupid, some
hard-working and others lazy." 23 According to this account,
because social and economic status reflects "intrinsic ability," the
status quo of differential opportunity could be defended on genetic
grounds. 24 On the other hand, some "liberals," concerned that
genetic diversity necessarily equates with differences in social
status, were forced to argue in favor of what Dobzhansky called
"the tabula rasa myth"25 of equality, essentially ignoring the
scientific evidence that humans differ to some degree in their
innate abilities and attributes.
Dobzhansky rejected both of these approaches on social and
genetic grounds. He agreed that there is a genetic component to
certain abilities and therefore one's "achieved role, status, and
18. See id. at 115.
19. Id.
20. Genetic manipulations of future generations to fill predetermined social
roles was a central theme of one of the leading futuristic satires of the day. See
ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
21. Dobzhansky, supra note 17, at 115.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 112.
24. Id. In essence, this was a key theme of the highly controversial book, The
Bell Curte. The other central theme was the asserted correlation of "race" with
intelligence. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY,THE BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 269 (1994).

25. Theodosius Dobzhansky, Is

Genetic Diversity Compatible with Human

Equality?, 20 SOCIAL BIOLOGY 280, 281 (1973).
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economic level" each have a genetic element. 26 Yet, the strong
effect of the environment precludes most genetic advantages from
being determinative. 27 In Dobzhansky's view, the distinctive
quality of humans is their "adaptability," "developmental
plasticity," and "educability."28 On the other hand, he dismissed
the idea that any application of intrinsic abilities in a meritocracy
will inevitably result in

a "genetic elite." 29 Referring to the

perpetuation of occupations based on inherited factors, he wrote:
Human populations, and in fact those of most sexual and
outbreeding species, are genetically far too heterogeneous for
such homozygosis. In every aptitude aggregation and in every
generation, the Mendelian recombination will therefore keep
producing individuals with genotypes
that favor occupations
30
other than those of their parents.
Dobzhansky concluded that "[tlhe myths of tabula rasa and of
genetic predestination are both equally deceptive; the truth is
found
in-between." 31 Consequently,
"genetic diversity
[is]
32
compatible with equality of opportunity."
Third, Dobzhansky believed that a political system affording
equality of opportunity is the best way for a society to deal with
extensive genetic diversity:
[B]ecause in that system people are allowed to, and are more
likely to, assume a role in society for which they are fitted by
virtue of their genetically and environmentally determined
abilities; in an aristocracy, by contrast, people would not be so
likely to find their way into the occupation
or social role for
33
which their genes especially fitted them.
Fourth, Dobzhansky believed that society must use genetic
information to promote beneficence.
In a frequently quoted
passage, he said: "[I]f we enable the weak and the deformed to live
and propagate their kind, we face the prospect of a genetic
twilight; but if we let them die or suffer when we can save them,
we face the certainty of a moral twilight."34 Dobzhansky's words

26. Id. at 285.
27. Id. at 286.
28. Id. at 287.
29. Id. at 285.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 287.
32. Id.
33. John Beatty, Dobzhansky and the Biology of Democracy: The Moral and
Political Significance of Genetic Variation, in THE EVOLUTION OF THEODOSIUS
DOBZHANSKY, supra note 16, at 209 (references omitted); see generally THEODOSIUS
DOBZHANSKY, THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN FREEDOM (1954).

34. Theodosius Dobzhansky, Man and Natural Selection, 49 AM. SCIENTIST 285,
296(1961).
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can be applied more broadly than merely to eugenics. They speak
to a moral imperative for society to use genetic variation for the
benefit of all rather than to enable the adverse treatment or
oppression of the most vulnerable.
In light of new findings in genetics and genomics, do
Dobzhansky's writings on equality have continued relevance? In
recent years, ever-expanding research has led to a body of
scientific knowledge that surely would astound Dobzhansky, not to
mention Gregor Mendel and Thomas Hunt Morgan. In 2001, the
Human Genome Project was completed with publication of the
draft sequence of the human genome, establishing a reference of
the 3.2 billion nucleotide base pairs of human DNA. 35 The results
of the Human Genome Project have confirmed that all humans are
99.9% alike in terms of their genetic makeup, and that there is
more variation between members of any particular racial or ethnic
group than between members of different groups. 36 As a relatively
young species, humans show less genetic variation than other
species of mammals, including our closest biological relatives,
37
chimpanzees, bonobos (pygmy chimpanzees), and gorillas.
New scientific evidence also has established the genetic basis
of human variation.
Each human differs from another, on
average, at about 3.2 million base pairs (one in one thousand base
pairs), 38 and these differences may be expressed in numerous
ways, including physical traits (e.g., height, eye color, hair color),
disease or predisposition to disease, 39 and elements of behavior
(including the
genetic contribution to intelligence
and
personality). 40 Genetic technologies also permit the accurate
assessment of parentage, more distant lineage, and even ancestral
41
patterns of population migration.

35. International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Sequencing
and Analysis of the Human Genome, 409 NATURE 860, 875 (2001).
36. Troy Duster & Pilar Ossorio, Race and Genetics: Controversies in
Biomedical, Behavioral, and Forensic Sciences, 60 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 115, 117
(2005).
37. Henrik Kaessman et al., Great Ape DNA Sequences Reveal a Reduced
Diversity and an Expansion in Humans, 27 NATURE GENETICS 155, 155 (2001).
38. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND
THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY 11-12 (2003).

39. This includes diseases caused by a single gene (monogenic), a combination
of genes (polygenic), and one or more genes and one or more environmental factors
(multi-factorial). See id. at 15.
40. See generally BEHAVIORAL GENETICS IN THE POSTGENOMIC ERA (Robert
Plomin et al. eds., 2003).
41. See Aravinda Chakravarti, Population Genetics-Making Sense Out of
Sequence, 21 NATURE GENETICS 56, 58-59 (1999).
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Modern genetics creates a paradox with regard to human
biological sameness and difference. Genetics confirms the close
kinship and common origins of all humans and definitively
42
establishes that race is a social, and not a biological, construct.
At the same time, genetics provides a detailed array of information
about individual variation at an exquisitely refined, molecular
level. Genetics helps explain, among other things, why particular
individuals differ in response to pharmaceutical products, have
certain allergies, or should avoid certain exposures. 43 Genetic
information may even permit predictions about the future course
44
of individual health and development.
The scientific ability to draw fine distinctions among people
based on genetic variation raises profound ethical, legal, and social
questions about how all this biological variation relates to the
broader concepts of equality and inequality. To further complicate
matters, the science is progressing from the ability to make
detailed assessments of variation to actually playing a part in
increasing the degree of genetic variation among humans. For
example,
new
reproductive
technologies
(including
preimplantation genetic diagnosis) may give some parents greater
control over the genotype of their offspring; 45 gene therapy and
pharmacogenomic-based therapies may give some individuals
access to more advanced therapeutics; 46 and genetic enhancement
techniques may give some individuals the ability to bolster favored
human traits (e.g., cognition, strength).47 These and other areas of
genetics raise questions about the morality of such undertakings
as well as the distributive ethics in affording access to the
48
technology.
Every American is familiar with the passage in the

42. See Francis S. Collins, Shattuck Lecture Medical and Societal
Consequences of the Human Genome Project, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 28, 34 (1999).
43. See Gilbert
S. Omenn & Arno G. Motalsky, Integration of
Pharmacogenomics into Medical Practice, in PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL,
ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 137 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2003).
44. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 42, at 30-31.
45. See D.S. King, PreimplantationGenetic Diagnosisand the "New" Eugenics,
25 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 178 (1999); John A. Robertson, Extending Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis: The Ethical Debate, 18 HUMAN REPRO. 465, 465 (2003).
46. See generally FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 108 (Allen
Buchanan et al. eds., 2000); MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS
TO THE GENOME: THE CHALLENGE TO EQUALITY 8 (1998).

47. See MEHLMAN, supra note 38, at 2; Michael H. Shapiro, The Impact of
Genetic Enhancement on Equality, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561, 563 (1999).
48. See Colin Farrelly, Distributive Justice and Genetics, in NATURE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HUMAN GENOME 42 (2003).
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Declaration of Independence proclaiming that "all men are created
equal." Of course, "all men" excluded "all women" and further
meant free, white, men owning property. 49 Also, "created equal"
was not an assessment of biological sameness, but a natural law
assessment of equality with regard to political and legal rights.
This interpretation is confirmed in the next clause that proclaims
"that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
50
...
rights.
Despite its centrality to the founding of the nation, political
equality remains an unfulfilled promise along many dimensions.
Yet, in addition to political, social, and economic inequality, the
nation will soon have to confront how to deal with increased
information about genetic variation. Some of the questions raised
include: How will increased knowledge of individual variation
affect the moral and political underpinnings of society? 51 What
challenges are presented by introducing increased information
about genetic diversity into a society increasingly unequal in
income distribution and other ways? Aside from health care
settings, when is it appropriate to consider individual genetic
variability in allocating social goods, and when should such
differences be ignored on the basis of privacy or other public
policies? Does this greater knowledge of subtle and profound
genetic differences support or detract from the Rawlsian notion of
society owing greater moral obligations to those who have received
52
a less favorable distribution of natural assets?
II. Common Law: Torts
53
A. Legal Overview

The law of negligence sets boundaries on the conduct of

49. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Burdens and Benefits of Race in America,
25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 221-24 (1998).
50. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
51. See Celeste Michelle Condit et al., Human Equality, Affirmative Action, and
Genetic Models of Human Variation, 4 RHETORIC & PUB. AFFAIRS 85 (2001); John
Harris & John Sulston, Genetic Equity, 5 NATURE REV. GENETICS 796 (2004).
52. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 106-107 (1971); see also LESLEY A.
JACOBS, PURSUING EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES:
EGALITARIAN JUSTICE (2004).

THE

THEORY

AND

PRACTICE

OF

53. Much of this section has been adapted from Mark A. Rothstein, Behavioral
Genetic Determinism: Its Effects on Culture and Lau, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS:
THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND BIOLOGY (Ronald A. Carson & Mark A. Rothstein eds.,
1999).
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individuals in their everyday lives. 5 4 In determining what conduct
exceeds legal bounds, it was essential for the common law to
develop a flexible, easily understandable, and readily applicable
standard for an individual's legal duty.55 The reasonable person
standard, originally expressed as the "reasonable man" standard,
was first applied to negligence law in England in the middle of the
nineteenth century.5 6 The concept was soon adopted in the United
States.5 7 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the genderneutral "reasonable person" standard came into use and is now
used in every state.58 The reasonable person standard is often
expressed as the reasonably prudent person, or some similar
terminology.5 9 The hypothetical reasonable person standard is not
the average person or the average juror, it is the personification of
a community ideal of reasonable behavior. 60 It is an objective and
61
largely unitary standard.
Although the law does not consider minor variations in the
character and abilities of the individual in establishing the
62
standard for evaluating conduct, there are some exceptions.
Children are held to the standard of a reasonable child of the same
age. 63 An individual's special talents or training are also
considered. 64 For example, in medical malpractice cases, the
standard of care is that of a reasonably prudent physician in good
standing in the profession, or if the physician is a specialist, it is
the reasonably prudent physician in a certain specialty. 65 If the
individual has a physical impairment, the standard is the
reasonably prudent person with the same impairment, such as the
reasonably prudent person with blindness. 66 The reasonably

54. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 162-64 (5th
ed. 1984).
55. Id. at 173-74.
56. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856); Vaughan
v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492-93 (1837).
57. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).

58. R.T. Austin, Better Off with the Reasonable Man Dead or the Reasonable
Man Did the Darndest Things, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 482 (1992).
59. KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, at 174.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 173 74.
62. See id. at 175-93.
63. Id. at 179.
64. See id. at 187.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 175 176. For example, a reasonably prudent person with blindness
would not attempt to cross a busy, unfamiliar street without the aid of a guide dog,
cane, or any assistive device. See id.
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prudent person standard, however, generally has not been
67
adjusted for mental impairments or behavioral shortcomings.
These matters historically were assumed to be impossible to assess
accurately. 68 Moreover, excusing the conduct of people because of
their asserted inability to conform to the reasonable person
69
standard was seen by the courts as an invitation to fraud.
There are three main rationales for the reasonable person
standard. First, the required conduct of the individual and the
70
outcomes of the cases were considered to be more predictable.
Second, having a unitary, objective standard allowed individuals
71
to have reasonable expectations about the behavior of others.
Third, the reasonably prudent person standard was deemed easier
for juries to apply, it could adapt over time, and it did not need
72
detailed codification.
B. Conceptions of Equality
The purposes of tort law are compensation, cost allocation,
and deterrence. 7 3 Equality of opportunity or other broad social
goals may be advanced indirectly by torts, but concerns about
equality have not been a part of the doctrinal development of the
field.74
The preceding brief review of tort law suggests the
following three important points relative to equality.
First, the reasonably prudent "man" standard of negligence
law reflects a pre-industrial, agrarian view that all men had a
basic skill set that included the ability to build and repair their
homes and equipment, tend to the needs of domesticated animals,
and deal with external threats ranging from wild animals to
intruders. Thus, there was assumed to be a narrow range of social
variability among individuals. This assumption, of course, is no
longer true.
67. KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, at 176-177. James W. Ellis, Tort
Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons, 6 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 1079, 1087-88

(1981).

54, at 177.
69. See, e.g., MeIntre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887).
68. KEETON ET AL., supra note

70. See John V. Jacobi, Fakers, Nuts, and Federalism: Common Law in the
Shadow of the ADA, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 115 (1999).

71. Donald E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in
Negligence Lau: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent,
50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 19 (1981).
72. See Paul T. Hayden, Cultural Norms as Lau: Tort Laus "Reasonable
Person" Standardof Care, 15 J. AM. CULTURE No. 1, 45 (1992).
73. KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, at 174.
74. See Leslie Bender, Tort Law's Role as a Tool for Social Justice Struggle, 37
WASHBURN L.J. 249 (1998).
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Second, beginning in the twentieth century, many of the
duties imposed upon individuals changed from common law duties
to statutorily imposed duties. 75 In the nineteenth century it would
be unreasonable for an individual to ride a horse through town at
an excessive rate of speed-the standard being the speed at which
a reasonable person would ride through town under the
circumstances. 7 6 Today, automotive speed limits are set by
statute, and the speed limit is generally admissible in a negligence
action as evidence of the standard of care required under the
77
circumstances.
Third, the reasonably prudent person standard implicitly
recognizes that all humans are not equal, but it uses
individualized standards only when the differences are obvious,
such as youth, infirmity, or possession of special skills. It is in this
area of negligence law that more individualized assessments of
genetically-influenced abilities and disabilities are likely to be
urged upon the courts. Whether courts will mandate or permit
increasingly detailed assessments of variation and thereby develop
a more individualized standard of care is likely to be based as
much on public policy as the state of the science.
Fourth, more formulaic or individualized standards of care
may undermine the social utility of the reasonably prudent person
analysis by juries:
Eliminating the negligence standard and the jury's role in
applying it would sacrifice something of political and social
importance: the opportunity for popular, collective judgments
about how each citizen should conduct herself or himself when
the pursuit of her or his
own objectives creates the risk of
78
injuring somebody else.
C. Implications
It is unlikely that the reasonably prudent person standard in
negligence law will be modified based on new genetic discoveries.
The use of a hypothetical, objective standard is deeply ingrained in
common law and a more individualized application of duty would
be extremely difficult to apply because the standard of care would
be different for each person and increasingly would be based on
75. See generally GUIDO

CALABRESI,

A

COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982).
76. See Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
77. See, e.g., Huston v. Chicago Transit Authority, 342 N.E.2d 190 (1976)
(admitting evidence of speed limit in a wrongful death negligence action).
78. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics
and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2000).
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scientific evidence rather than the common experience of the
community. 79 Furthermore, the application of genetic variation in
negligence cases could lead to genetic evidence of capacity to enter
into contracts, genetic assessment of the duty owed by bailees and
other actors in property transactions, and in many other common
law situations. Genetic information is more likely to be used in
other tort contexts besides determining the standard of care, such
as in proving causation8 0 and predicting life expectancy for
81
calculating damages.
III. Statutes: Employment Discrimination Laws
A. Legal Overview
One of the singular achievements of the presidency of Lyndon
Johnson was enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.82 Among
other things, the Act prohibits discrimination in public
accommodations 83 and government services. 84 Title VII of the Act
was the first comprehensive federal legislation prohibiting
85
employment discrimination by employers in the private sector.
In pertinent part, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... "86
The legislative history of Title VII makes it clear that the
purpose of the statute was to redress the substantially skewed
employment rates and income of African Americans caused by

79. A more subjective standard of capacity and duty are much more likely to be
applied in the criminal law. See generally Lori B. Andrews, Predicting and
Punishing Antisocial Acts: How the Criminal Justice System Might Use Behavioral
Genetics, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND BIOLOGY, supra

note 53, at 116; Mark A. Rothstein, Applications of Behavioural Genetics:
Outpacing the Science?, 6 NATURE REV. GENETICS 793 (2005).
80. See generally Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL
L. REV. 949 (2001); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility and Biomarkers in
Toxic Injury Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 67 (2000).
81. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff
Genetic Profiles by Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury
Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877 (1996).
82. John Robert Lewis, The King Legacy, 30 VT. L. REV. 349, 355 (2006).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (2004).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2004).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2004).
86. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1).
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discrimination in the workplace.87 Title VII was a key component
of a larger strategy: "[T]he ultimate goal of antidiscrimination law
88
is to eliminate not merely racial inequality but racism itself."
In addition to race, Title VII also prohibits discrimination
based on the other "immutable characteristics" of color, national
origin and sex as well as on the basis of religion.8 9 It issignificant
that Congress did not prohibit all unreasonable employer actions
or all employment discrimination, but only discrimination based
on certain factors. Furthermore, the factors chosen represented a
congressional determination that these criteria were the most
pervasive, irrational, invidious, hurtful, and politically untenable
forms of discrimination. 90
In terms of "equality," it is important to note that not all of
the bases of discrimination are products of the same legislative
history and they are not treated identically in the statute. When
Title VII was first introduced in Congress it did not include
protection against gender-based discrimination. 91 Representative
Howard W. Smith of Virginia, the conservative chairman of the
House Rules Committee, was a staunch opponent of the proposed
legislation. 92 Late in the legislative process, he introduced an
amendment to add sex to the categories of prohibited
discrimination, believing that doing so would ensure the bill's
defeat. 93 Nevertheless, to Smith's apparent surprise, the bill, as
94
amended, was passed by Congress and signed into law.
Several provisions
of Title VII indicate
different
congressional treatment of the five categories of proscribed
discrimination. 95 For example, section 704(e) provides that it is not

87. See U.S.C.C.A.N. 2513 2517, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Owen M. Fiss, A
Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971).
88. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 9

(1996).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a)(1).
90. See Paul Brest, Foreward:In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,90
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1976).

91. Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got Into Title VII Persistent Opportunism as a

Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAw & INEQ. 163, 163 (1991).
92. Id.

93. See

CHARLES WHALEN

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

&

1964

BARBARA

WHALEN,

DEBATE: A
(1985); Freeman, supra

THE LONGEST

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 116

note 91, at 163. But cf. Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives,
and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
49 J. So. HIST. 37, 44 45 (1983) (suggesting that it is unclear whether Smith
intended to scuttle Title VII or whether he truly supported the addition of sex
discrimination).
94. Freeman, supra note 91, at 163.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2e (2004). It is sometimes said, incorrectly, that
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unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of "religion,
sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise." 96 Significantly, race cannot be used as a
97
bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ").
Section 7016) of Title VII provides that "[t]he term 'religion'
includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."9 8 Although
phrased as a defense, the provision imposes a duty of reasonable
accommodation for religion when there is no similar duty for any
of the other categories under Title VII. In practice, this duty has
been construed quite narrowly. 99 The duty of reasonable
accommodation is more rigorously applied and more frequently
construed in the context of cases arising under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA").100

In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by adding the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"),101 which provides in part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability to
work ....102

Title VII creates certain "protected classes," when Title VII actually creates
proscribed criteria for employers to use in making personnel decisions. In fact,
Title VII protects members of all races, religions, national origin, and religious
groups and both sexes from discrimination.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(e). See, e.g., Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.
1998) (upholding gender BFOQ for a correctional facility's female-only posts where
the officers would be required to observe inmates in the shower and toilet areas).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(e).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
99. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986) (holding that
Congress did not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (limiting employer's duty of
reasonable accommodation to minimal efforts).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2004); see generally 1 MARKA. ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.8 (3d ed. 2004).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2004); see Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality
under the PregnancyDiscrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 929 (1985).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
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Congress enacted the law after the Supreme Court held that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy did not constitute sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII.103 PDA cases have usually
10 4
involved leaves of absence and health benefits.
A final Title VII principle to mention is the disparate impact
doctrine. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.105 was a class action race
discrimination suit alleging that the employer's hiring and
promotion policies violated Title VII. Before the effective date of
Title VII, African American employees at Duke Power were
limited to the lowest paying "labor" department jobs. 10 6 After Title
VII took effect, overt racial segregation of job categories was
illegal, and Duke Power disbanded its race-based job assignment
policy.107 Nevertheless, to qualify for a job other than labor, new
employees were required to have a high school diploma and to pass
two aptitude tests.10 8 Incumbent labor employees without a high
school education could transfer by getting a passing score on the
aptitude tests. 10 9 Neither of the tests measured specific abilities
needed for the non-labor jobs.110 The use of these measures had a
disparate impact on the African American employees and
applicants, thereby perpetuating the status quo of largely
segregated job categories on the basis of race. 1
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the employer
violated Title VII, notwithstanding lower court holdings that there
was insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination.11 2
The
Court added a judicial "disparate impact" theory onto the
disparate treatment language of Title VII: "[G]ood intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability."11 3 If selection criteria generate disproportionate
results along one of Title VII's proscribed dimensions, then the
employer has the burden of demonstrating that the selection
procedures are job-related and consistent with business necessity
103.
104.
105.
106.

See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 427.

107. Id.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 427 28.
at 428.
at 436.
at 428-36.
at 432.
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-in other words, that they are essential to the business. 114 Griggs
is considered a landmark case in furthering equal employment
opportunity, as any other result would have permitted the
115
perpetuation of past discrimination.
The other employment statute with clear relevance to
equality is the ADA.116 Section 102(a) of the ADA provides that
"[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."' 117 The term disability is defined in the statute as
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the [individual's] major life activities ... ; (B) a record of

such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment."1 18
Thus, the ADA does not prohibit all
discrimination based on disability. It prohibits discrimination
against a narrow subclass of individuals who have a disability that
is severe enough to constitute a substantial limitation of a major
life activity, but not so severe that the individual is prevented from
performing the essential functions of the job, with or without
reasonable accommodation.11 9
One of the unique elements of the ADA is the duty of
114. Id. The Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989), shifted much of the burden of proving disparate impact
discrimination to the plaintiff. Congress responded by enacting the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), a key provision of which amends
Title VII to restore the burden of proof in disparate impact cases to the pre-Wards
Cote allocation. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(2). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2004).
115. Some scholars, however, have argued that the disparate impact theory of
Griggs was a clumsy way to bring about the preferred result. See, e.g., Michael
Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (2006)
(concluding that the disparate impact theory has a strikingly limited impact and is
a difficult theory on which to succeed).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1201 2213 (2004). This Article does not discuss the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 634 (2004), or any of the
myriad state and local anti-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination based
on genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, or other factors. Many
of the issues related to equality raised by these laws are similar to those raised by
Title VII and the ADA.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
119. Numerous commentators have criticized the statutory scheme and the
narrow judicial interpretations that have further limited the ADA's coverage. My
analysis of the problem and proposed solution appear in Mark A. Rothstein et al.,
Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability:A Proposal to Amend the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243 (2002).
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reasonable accommodation. If an individual is unable to perform
the essential functions of the job because of disability, then the
employer must determine whether reasonable accommodation
120
would enable the individual to perform the essential functions.
Reasonable accommodation may include making facilities
accessible, job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies, and
the provision of qualified readers or interpreters.1 21 Reasonable
accommodation is not required, however, if it results in "undue
hardship" to the employer, defined as, "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense," in light of factors such as the
nature and cost of the accommodation and the size and financial
resources of the company. 122 In keeping with the clear legislative
history, the courts have construed the reasonable accommodation
requirement in the ADA as mandating a much greater level of
effort and expense on the part of employers than is required by the
comparable language applicable to religious discrimination under
Title VII.123
B. Conceptions of Equality
Title VII, the ADA, and other employment discrimination
laws are specifically designed to ensure equality of opportunity in
the workplace and, more generally, to facilitate the complete
integration into society of individuals who have been subject to
overt or subtle forms of discrimination. 12 4 Thus, unlike torts and
occupational health law, ensuring equality is the purpose of the
law rather than an incidental consequence in attempting to
advance other societal objectives.
The brief review of legal principles underlying employment

120. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(10).
123. See generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., 1 EMPLOYMENT LAW TREATISE §
3.8 (3d ed. 2004).
124. This Article does not consider whether anti-discrimination laws
inappropriately violate the tenet of governmental neutrality advocated by
libertarian philosophy. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (exploring the place

and scope of the antidiscrimination principle); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974) (investigating the interplay between individual rights and the
state. assuming that such legislative action is justified, and addressing the specifics
of the conceptions of equality embodied in the laws and means for achieving the
intended consequences).
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discrimination laws indicates four important elements bearing on
the issue of equality. First, not all differences among individuals
are subject to protection. Congress focused only on certain forms
of discrimination it considered pervasive, objectionable, and
remediable. 125
The result was the creation of a categorical
classification scheme of proscribed bases for differentiating among
individuals in the workplace. In addition, of the areas subject to
statutory protection, not all of the differences are treated the same
by law. 126
There are different standards for reasonable
accommodation, BFOQ, and other legal concepts to reflect the
degree to which societal opprobrium attaches to discrimination
based on certain criteria as well as the practicalities in
127
distinguishing among individuals in the workplace.
Second, in effect, the law tells employers that they must
overlook or ignore certain clear differences in the credentials of
employees. For example, in Griggs, employers are told that they
cannot require employees to be high school graduates because of
the disparate impact of such a policy, unless it can prove that
128
being a high school graduate is essential to a particular job.
Employers must bear the cost of "validating" their selection
criteria and of foregoing a qualification credential that, arguably,
improves the overall quality of their workforce. 129 Inefficiencies
are thereby imposed on individual employers under the
assumption that doing so is essential to redress a history of
130
pervasive societal discrimination.
Third, employers are required to bear the economic costs (or
pass them on to their customers) caused by the employment
discrimination laws, and thus the laws are redistributive. 131 For
example, there is no question that it is more costly for an employer
to hire a woman who is pregnant, knowing that she is likely to go

125. See Brest, supra note 90; Fiss, supra note 87, at 235.
126. Id.
127. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrongful?
Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
128. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
129. Id.
130. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 642, 698 (2001).
131. See generally John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Laws in
Perspective: Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583 (1994) (analyzing the
transformations of employment law and the debate over its scope); Sharona
Hoffman, Correctiie Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 Am. U. L. REV. 1213 (2003)
(assessing the efficacy of the ADA, specifically its goal of distributive justice);
Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates and Anti-discrimination Lau, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 223 (2000) (analyzing the distributive effects of accommodation mandates).
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on maternity leave within a relatively short period of time, and
then needing to replace the woman if she does not return to work
after childbirth. These additional expenses are, implicitly, deemed
to be a reasonable cost for making employment opportunities more
widely available.13 2
Similarly, the cost of reasonable
accommodation, up to the point of undue hardship, is deemed
acceptable to facilitate the employment of individuals with
133
disabilities.
Individuals with disabilities are considered to have the same
right of equal employment opportunity as other individuals, and it
is the nation's policy not to let myths, stereotypes, and prejudices
operate to preclude their participation in the workforce. 134 In
theory, if someone uses a wheelchair, widening doors and adding
ramps will substantially redress the difference in mobility, thereby
permitting individuals with mobility impairments to have equal
employment opportunity. They can then compete with other
workers for jobs based on job-related criteria, such as education,
training, and experience. Even though the ADA uses a civil rights
model to protect equality of opportunity, it is a different civil
rights model than13 Title
VII. Whereas Title VII is based on a
"sameness" model, 5 the ADA uses a "difference" model 136 which
requires an individualized determination of fitness 137 and an

132. See Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RtUTGERS L.J. 861, 940 944 (2004) (examining
disability theory to compare the ADA and antidiscrimination laws).
133. Id.
134. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987). See also Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability,"86 VA. L. REV. 397, 504 19
(2000) (analyzing case law on disability and arguing for a subordination-focused
approach).
135. For example, Title VII, as amended by the PDA, prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of pregnancy and related medical conditions.
Nevertheless, employers are under no duty to make reasonable accommodations for
pregnant employees (e.g., limiting exposures to toxins, shifting to light duty jobs).
See Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 1994). If
pregnant employees cannot perform all aspects of their job, they may be lawfully
discharged (if the employee elects not to take unpaid leave pursuant to the Family
and Medical Leave Act). Id.
See generally D'Andra Millsap, Reasonable
Accommodation of Pregnancy in the Workplace: A Proposalto Amend the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1411, 1421 (1996).
136. See Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of
Workplace Disabilities,44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2003); see also James
Leonard, The Equality Trap: How Traditional Civil Rights Concepts Has Rendered
Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005) (arguing that the
civil rights model is inconsistent with the ADA's reasonable accommodation model
that requires employers to recognize and take actions based on differences).
137. See Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 176 F.3d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 1999);
Rascon v. US West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1998).
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individualized
interactive process to develop
reasonable
138
accommodation.
Fourth, Congress based the discrimination laws on the
premise that benefits will not only accrue to the individuals who
have been excluded from the workplace, but to society more
generally.13 9
In theory, if not in practice, employment
discrimination laws help to ensure that individuals will not be
employed in jobs below their qualifications, individuals will be
taxpayers and consumers rather than recipients of public and
private largess, and the fabric of American society will be
140
strengthened through equal status interaction in the workplace.
The better utilization of individuals without regard to their
differences is certainly in accord with Dobzhansky's exhortation
not to waste human resources.
C. Implications
Employment discrimination law already has changed as a
result of new advances in genetics. Two-thirds of the states have
enacted laws prohibiting employers from requesting or requiring
that applicants or employees undergo genetic testing as a
condition of employment as well as using genetic information to
discriminate in hiring, promotion, dismissal, wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of employment. 14 1 Similar legislation
42
has been pending in Congress since the mid-1990s.
Unfortunately, these laws have limited value because they do not
prohibit employers, after a conditional offer of employment, from
requiring the signing of an authorization for release of an
individual's complete health records, thereby gaining access to
genetic information generated in the clinical setting. 43 So long as
employers have the ability to access individual health records
containing genetic information, many at-risk individuals who

138. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
139. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Cii il Society,
and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2000).
140. Id.
141. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION

IN

EMPLOYMENT

LAWS,

aivailable

at

http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm.
142. The most recent bill is the Genetic Information and Nondiscrimination Act
of 2007, S.358 and H.R. 493, 110th Cong. (2007).
143. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE GENETIC
PRIVACY LAWS, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm.
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might benefit from genetic testing will decline to be tested. 144
Discouragement of appropriate genetic testing in the clinical
setting, rather than adverse treatment by employers, is the major
policy problem associated with genetics in the workplace, and it
remains unaddressed by these legislative measures. About a
dozen states also have enacted broader "genetic privacy" laws that,
among other things, require written consent for the release of
genetic information. 145 These laws attempt to protect privacy and
prevent discrimination by barring any consideration of genetic
information.
Employment discrimination represents the most aggressive
use of the "genetics is irrelevant" approach to the law. At the
same time, it is the area with the least social return for all of the
legislative time and attention.
There have been very few
documented instances of employment discrimination based on
predictive genetic information. 46 Avoiding the discouragement of
clinical testing due to fear of employer access justifies establishing
the public policy of nondiscrimination in employment based on
genetic information. The legislation enacted thus far, however,
does not prevent employer access to genetic information in clinical
records, and it singles out genetic information for special
147
attention, thereby reinforcing the stigma attached to genetics.
Consequently, the potentially salutary uses of genetic information
in the workplace and elsewhere to provide risk assessments upon
which health and lifestyle decisions might be based have been
buried beneath a layer of fear and hollow legislative rhetoric.

144. See Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic
CARE L. & POL'Y 225 (2000); Karen
Rothenberg et al., Genetic Information and the Workplace: Legislative Approaches
and Policy Challenges, 275 SCIENCE 1755 (1997).

Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH

145. STATE GENETIC PRIVACY LAWS, supra note 143.

146. One of the only, and certainly the best known, reported cases involving
genetic discrimination is Norman-Bloodsaw u. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d
1260 (9th Cir. 1998), where the Ninth Circuit held, among other things, that sickle
cell trait testing of African American employees without their consent violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
147. See Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic DiscriminationExceptional?, 29
Am. J.L. & MED. 77 (2003); Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Perils of Genetics
Exceptionalism, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 669 (2001).
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IV. Regulation: Occupational Health
A. Legal Overview

148

Occupational health law is the third legal regime examined
in this Article to illustrate new frontiers in equality.
The
promulgation and enforcement of occupational health standards
involve neither a common law system, like torts, nor a statutory
scheme, like employment discrimination, but a regulatory system.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), the
agency of the United States Department of Labor responsible for
workplace safety and health, relies on scientific evidence of human
health risk to set standards for hazardous exposures under a
statutory framework. 149 A similar analysis would apply to
environmental health regulation by the Environmental Protection
Agency or the regulation of pharmaceutical products by the Food
and Drug Administration.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSH Act")150 is the
primary federal law regulating workplace safety and health.
Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act, which deals with the promulgation
of standards for toxic substances or harmful physical agents,
provides in part: "The Secretary shall set the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible .... that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health.

... 151 Despite the

absolute "no employee" language, the Supreme Court has rejected
the notion that the OSH Act requires regulation at the level of zero
risk.152

Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute ("The Benzene Case")15

3

involved an industry challenge to

rulemaking by OSHA that lowered the permissible exposure limit
for benzene. 154 In striking down the standard, the plurality
opinion of the Court stated "that the statute was not designed to
require employers to provide absolutely risk-free workplaces

148. Some of the material in this section has been adapted from Mark A.
Rothstein, Occupational Health and Discrimination Issues Raised by
Toxicogenomics in the Workplace in GENOMICS

AND

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

(Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., forthcoming 2007).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b)(5) (2000).
150. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 678 (2000).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
152. See Indust. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene
Case), 448 U.S. 607, 614 15 (1980).
153. Id. at 607.
154. Id.
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whenever it is technologically feasible to do so ... [but] was
intended to require the elimination, as far as feasible, of
significant risks of harm." 155 Although the Supreme Court never
explicitly stated whether the OSH Act requires employers to
maintain exposure levels that would protect the most sensitive
workers, The Benzene Case implicitly rejects this idea.
OSHA's health standards generally have not been developed
with an explicit concern for individual variability in response to
toxic substances. Rather, OSHA bases the standards on the
assumption that substantially all employees are at a similar
risk. 156
Although OSHA designs standards to provide the
maximum protection possible, OSHA recognizes that it may not be
possible to protect workers with heightened sensitivity. For
example, the preamble to the coke oven emissions standard
provides:
Because of the variability of individual response to
carcinogens and other factors, the concept of a "threshold
level" may have little applicability on the basis of existing
knowledge. Some individuals may be more susceptible than
others. Thus, while a "threshold" exposure level, below which
exposure does not cause cancer, may conceivably exist for an
individual, susceptible individuals in the working population
may have cancer induced by doses so low as to be effectively
zero.157

It is not clear what compliance measures employers must or
could take to protect the health of employees for whom the
relevant OSHA standard is insufficiently protective.
In The
Benzene Case, the Supreme Court arguably supported additional
precautions when it upheld the principle of "action level" medical
testing. 158 According to the Court, testing employees exposed at
an action level below the permissible exposure level "could ensure
that workers who were unusually susceptible ... could be removed
from exposure before they had suffered any permanent
damage." 15 9 The courts have not ruled on whether employers have
a duty to supply additional personal protective equipment,
implement shift rotation, or take other measures beyond what the
standard mandates to facilitate the continued employment of an
individual whose post-exposure medical monitoring identified the
155. Id. at 641.
156. See id. at 657 (agreeing with principle of "action level" medical surveillance
to ensure that workers showing ill effects of exposure below the OSHA standard
could be removed from further exposure).
157. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1129 (2005).
158. See The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 645.
159. Id. at 657 (footnote omitted).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 25:2

employee as "unusually susceptible." The courts also have not
determined whether the employer could use genetic or other
predictive tests to exclude "sensitive" individuals before being
hired or exposed.
Another law with relevance to workplace equality in the
context of occupational health isTitle VII. In International Union,
United Auto Workers v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 160 the employer
was concerned about its possible liability if a pregnant female
employee was occupationally exposed to lead and later gave birth
to a child with congenital defects caused by the mother's
workplace exposure. 161 Under the metabolic stress of pregnancy,
lead stored in the mother's bones may be released into her
bloodstream and then into the fetus. 162 Thus, female employees
could transmit lead to a developing fetus even from preconception
exposures.
Furthermore, the fetus is most sensitive to lead
163
exposure in the early stages of pregnancy.
With these exposure modes in mind, Johnson Controls
adopted a "fetal protection policy" that barred all fertile womenregardless of their marital status, reproductive plans, or other
considerations-from any job likely to elevate their blood lead
above a certain level.164 The Supreme Court held that the
company's "fetal protection policy" constituted sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII.165 The Court said that by excluding only
women with childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs, the
employer's policy
involved explicit,
disparate
treatment
discrimination, which could be upheld only by applying a BFOQ
defense.166
The Court considered the statutory defense of BFOQ under
Title VII as narrow. 167 It permits discrimination based on gender
only in certain narrow circumstances where discrimination is
-reasonably necessary' to the 'normal operation' of the 'particular
160. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
161. See id. at 190.
162. Jacqueline M. Moline & Philip J. Landrigan, Lead, in TEXTBOOK OF
CLINICAL OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE 971 (Linda Rosenstock et
al. eds., 2004.) (reference omitted).
163. See Laura S. Welch, Decisionmaking About Reproductive Hazards, 1 SEM.
OCCUP. MED. 97, tbl 1, 2 (1986) (Table 1 shows that fetuses are more sensitive to
toxins in weeks 3 through 9 of pregnancy and Table 2 lists lead as a toxin that
causes adverse pregnancy outcomes).
164. Int'l Union, United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
191-92 (1991).
165. Id. at 211.
166. Id. at 200.
167. Id. at 201.
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business."' 168 Although safety concerns may establish a BFOQ,
"the safety exception is limited to instances in which sex or
pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to
perform the job." 169 In Johnson Controls, the Court concluded that
170
the employer failed to establish the BFOQ defense.
Significantly, it said that concerns about the welfare of the next
generation did not establish a BFOQ of female sterility: "Decisions
about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents
who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the
1 71
employers who hire those parents."
B. Conceptions of Equality
The purpose of occupational health law is to safeguard the
health of workers from the risks caused by dangerous exposures in
the workplace. Although the principal legislation, the OSH Act,
was not designed to promote equality, the comparison of individual
workers to a hypothetical, average worker raises important ethical
and legal challenges.
First, the pertinent statutory provision directs the Secretary
of Labor to promulgate standards to protect all workers,1 72 but it
may not be feasible to set standards so low as to protect the most
sensitive individuals. To date the vast majority of sensitive
workers cannot be identified prior to exposure.1 73 A few OSHA
standards, such as the lead standard, provide that employees
whose blood lead levels after exposure exceed OSHA limits must
be given "medical removal" with their job and pay rate protected
until their blood lead returns to an acceptable level. 174 It is
unknown to what extent, if at all, future OSHA health standards
will be drafted to take into account the known genetic variability
of workers.
Second, even with a uniform exposure limit, it is unclear
whether employers have heightened duties to sensitive workers
beyond compliance with the applicable OSHA standard. An issue
of longstanding debate is whether employers can "protect" workers

168. Id.
169. Id. at 203.
170. Id. at 206.
171. Id.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
173. See Joseph V. Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation in Humans Exposed
to Toxic Substances, 14 J. L. & POL'Y 39, 57 (2006).
174. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW

115 (2007).
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by denying them employment opportunities. 175 With an increase in
validated toxicogenomic1 76 tests, 177 the number of identifiable atrisk individuals is likely to expand substantially, and individuals
so identified will likely vary greatly in the magnitude of their risk,
severity of consequences, latency, treatability, and other key
factors. 178 Workers will also differ as to whether they want to
assume the risk of working with toxic exposures.
Third, at least with regard to reproductive health hazards,
the Supreme Court has given greater weight to equality of
opportunity and employee autonomy than the employer's concern
about possible liability and speculation about individual risks. It
is unclear whether the principle of worker autonomy in risk
acceptability from Johnson Controls will be extended to other
types of hazards. It is also unclear whether reproductive hazards
will be distinguished as involving a different statute (Title VII)
and uniquely intimate health matters that should be outside the
179
control of employers.
C. Implications
Genetic predisposition to occupational disease, and the
analogous
applications
in
environmental
health
and
pharmaceutical regulation, raises difficult scientific, economic, and
legal issues. In general, public policy should require the reduction
of toxic exposures to the lowest feasible levels needed to ensure
healthful workplaces for all workers. When scientific evidence
18 0
indicates genetic variability in response to certain exposures,

175. See

OFFICE

OF

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

UNITED

STATES

GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE chs. 7, 8

CONGRESS,

(1990).

176. Toxicogenomics is the "application of global gene expression profiling,
including DNA microarray technologies and proteomics, to study the relationship
between exposure and disease and to understand gene-environment interactions
and their impact on human health."
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMMUNICATING TOXICOGENOMICS INFORMATION TO NONEXPERTS: A WORKSHOP
SUMMARY 10 (2005) (quoting Dr. William Greenlee's definition of Toxicogenomics).
177. See Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Eni ironmental Law: Redefining Public
Health, 93 CAL. L. REV. 171, 190 (2005).
178. See Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J. L. &
POL'Y 7, 8 (2006).
179. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80-87 (2002) (upholding
validity of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interpretation of ADA
providing a defense to employers if employment of an individual would constitute a
direct threat to self as well as others).
180. A leading example is differential sensitivity to beryllium. Researchers have
identified an increased risk of chronic beryllium disease among workers with a
particular genotype. See Erin C. McCanlies et al., HLA-DPB1 and Chronic
Beryllium Disease:A HuGE Review, 157 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 388, 395 (2003).
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applicants and employees should be offered optional genetic
testing through independent physicians and laboratories, with the
results disclosed only to the individuals.18 1 After appropriate
counseling, if individuals elect to work with the exposure,
employers should be required to provide medical monitoring,
personal protective equipment, and other measures that the
employee reasonably requests to increase the level of protection.
Employers would be justified in denying employment to
individuals based on genetic factors only when an individual's
exposure would present a direct and immediate threat of serious
18 2
harm to the individual, other workers, or the public.
V. Toward New Conceptions of Equality
Equality is a dominant theme in American law. "Equal
justice under law" is emblazoned on the Supreme Court building.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
been widely invoked in a range of constitutional cases to ensure
equal treatment by the government.
We rejoice in the
renunciation of "separate but equal," and ponder the proper path
to a more egalitarian society. Choosing examples to illustrate the
centrality and varying treatment of equality by the law is easy.
The difficult task is trying to discern how the law and society
should respond as scientists perfect the ability to identify
individual variations at the genetic level.
In light of the approaches to equality discussed in this Article
and the thrust of enacted and proposed legislation on genetics, it is
important to consider whether the current public policy in the
United States has been well conceived and thoughtfully
implemented. At least in the context of employment
discrimination, the legislative approach has been to embrace the
notion that information about genetic variation should be
suppressed or ignored. In numerous contexts, however, both
within and beyond the workplace, it may not be beneficial to
ignore individual genetic variation or to pretend that individual
differences have no meaning. It also will be increasingly difficult
to keep genetic information private when third parties, such as
employers and life insurers, can require a blanket authorization to
18 3
release all of an individual's health records.
181. Mark A. Rothstein, Genetics and the Work Force of the Next Hundred Years,
2000 COLtUM. BtUS. L. REV. 371, 395 (2000).

182. Id. at 393 95.
183. See Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan Talbott, Compelled Disclosure of Health
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The primary public policy response to the increase in genetic
information has been to enact "genetic nondiscrimination" and
"genetic privacy" laws.1 8 4 The National Human Genome Research
Institute of the National Institutes of Health established the
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications ("ELSI") Program, which
funded research that greatly influenced the enactment of these
laws.1 8 5 The ELSI program was conceived by James Watson, codiscoverer of the structure of DNA and the first director of the
Human Genome Project.18 6 As Watson later explained about the
ELSI Program:
In putting ethics so soon into the genome agenda, I was
responding to my own personal fear that all too soon critics of
the Genome Project would point out that I was a
representative of the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory that once
housed the Eugenics Record Office. My not forming a genome
ethics program might be falsely used as evidence that I was a
closet eugenicist, having as my real long-term purpose the
unambiguous identification of genes that lead to social and
occupational stratification as well as genes justifying racial
discrimination. So I saw the need to be proactive in making
ELSI's major purpose clear from its start-to devise better
ways to combat the social injustice
that has at its roots bad
187
draws [sic] of the genetic dice.
The genetic nondiscrimination and genetic privacy laws
implicitly attempt to advance the vision of a "genome-blind"
society. It is questionable, however, whether a genome-blind
public policy necessarily will assuage public concerns about
eugenics or whether such a strategy ever could be successful. It is
even more doubtful whether such an approach ought to be
pursued.
The civil rights model of "sameness" and the fiction that "all
difference is irrelevant" are inappropriate legal models for genetic
diversity. Moreover, ignoring differences is not the only way to
protect privacy and prevent invidious discrimination based on
genetic variation. What I have labeled as "genome-blind" policies
are today's equivalent of the "tabula rasa myth" of genetics about
which Dobzhansky wrote decades ago.
2882, 2884 (2006).
184. See supra notes 141 and 142.
185. See ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND THE
HUMAN GENOME 23 41 (1994); Eric Juengst, Self-Critical Federal Science? The
Ethics Experiment Within the U.S. Human Genome Project, 13 SOCIAL PHIL. &
POL'Y 63 (1996).
186. See COOK-DEEGAN, supra note 1855; Juengst, supra note 185.
187. JAMES WATSON, A PASSION FOR DNA: GENES, GENOMES & SOCIETY 202
(2000).
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Debates about the genetic models of equality and difference
have numerous historical and scholarly antecedents. For example,
in the first half of the twentieth century W.E.B. Du Bois and
Booker T. Washington famously debated whether integration or
188
separation should be the goal of the civil rights movement.
More recently, many critical race scholars have rejected "color
blind" approaches to racial equality because they believe that
these approaches perpetuate the status quo. 189 Instead, some
advocate the use of race-conscious measures to overcome historical
patterns of discrimination. 190
Similarly, some feminist scholars have argued that adopting
the "sameness" approach to civil rights means viewing the world
through the lens of the dominant group-in the United States,
white males.1 91
Gender equality, they assert, should not be
grounded on regarding females "as if' they were males, but on
recognizing the differences between males and females,
demonstrating respect for all individuals, and supporting the
special needs of both sexes. 192 The "equality" versus "sameness"
controversy in feminism mirrors the "normal" versus "queer"
debate in the gay community.
"As African-Americans split
between integration and separatism, or women split between
equality and difference feminism, gays are splitting between
1 93
normalcy and queerness."
During the 1980s, in response to lobbying by activists and
public health officials, virtually every state enacted laws
protecting the confidentiality of HIV test results. 194 These laws
required express (often written) informed consent, authorized
anonymous testing, and prohibited case reporting to, and contact
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tracing by, public health officials after a positive test result. 195
The theory behind these laws was that there was a substantial
public health interest in identifying HIV-positive individuals so
that they could take actions to prevent further transmission of the
virus. 196 Public officials were concerned that fear of individual
identification, with its intense stigma, discrimination, and
potential loss of health care coverage, would "drive individuals
underground" and dissuade voluntary testing. 197 Two decades
later, with new treatments that substantially improve the
prognosis for HIV/AIDS patients and a decrease in the intensity of
the stigma attached to HIV infection, the rationale for such an
approach has dissipated and many jurisdictions have revised their
laws and policies to require names-based notification of public
health agencies of positive test results. 198 In 2006, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention recommended routine HIV testing
of all individuals between ages 13 and 64 in the clinical setting. 199
Genetics and genomics are rapidly developing scientific
fields. Public policies developed today must be crafted for an everchanging landscape. If there ever was a justification for adopting
the vision of a "genome-blind" society, it has faded or will certainly
do so shortly. Unlike an HIV test, which is a single test with a
single result, there are over 1,400 genetic tests commonly
available, 200 and they vary greatly in the type of information they
reveal. 20 1 Only a few of the tests focus on rare, monogenic,
Mendelian disorders with a high penetrance and dire prognosis as
exemplified by Huntington's disease. 20 2 Within a relatively short
195. See id.
196. Id. at 164.
197. Id. at 155.
198. See Dorothy Puzio, An Oierriew of Public Health in the New Millenium:
Individual Liberty us. Public Safety, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 187 (2003/2004). See
generally Sheedah Moayery, National HIV Reporting: What's in a Name?, 8 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 439, 471 72 (2001).
199. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Reiised Recommendations for
HIV Testing of Adults, Adolescents, and Pregnant Women in Health Care Settings,
55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. RR-14 1, 8-9 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5514al.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2006). See Lawrence 0. Gostin, HIV Screening in Health Care Settings: Public
Health and Ciril Liberties in Conflict?, 296 JAMA 2023, 2023 (2006).
200. Genetic Testing, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/genetictesting.html
(last accessed Mar. 28, 2007).
201. Descriptions of the various genetic tests appear at http://www.genetests.org.
202. Huntington's disease is an autosomal dominant neurodegenerative disorder
of late adult onset characterized by involuntary body movements, cognitive
impairments, and progressively deteriorating symptoms leading to death. See
NINDS
Huntington's
Disease
Information
Page,
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/huntington/huntington.htm (last visited Mar.
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period of time it will become routine for pharmacogenomic testing
to precede the prescription of a wide range of pharmaceuticals, and
the results will be regularly recorded in the health records of
millions of individuals. 20 3 It is unrealistic and counterproductive
to embrace a vision of equality that demands obscuring or ignoring
such information.
Deciding on the most appropriate principle of genomic
equality in any given situation is more than an academic exercise.
Conceptions of equality directly affect health care finance, medical
underwriting in various insurance products, occupational and
environmental health regulation, criminal responsibility, and
many other important areas. 20 4 The significance of recognizing
individual variation is illustrated by the federal Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 5 which establishes that all
children have a right to a "free, appropriate public education."
Differences in ability and performance, part of which are based on
genetic factors, 20 6 determine what educational program is
appropriate for each child. 20 7 Individual assessment is essential,
and it is understood that not all children have the same abilities
and needs. 208 Ignoring differences among children would mean the
end of special education and gifted programs. 20 9 Even though it is
not required by law, the lack of an individual focus would
undermine the educational ideal of developing child-specific
educational strategies to maximize the potential of each child.
IDEA codifies the principle that every child ought to receive an
appropriate education, not the identical education. 2 10 In this
context, equality of opportunity demands recognizing individual
differences.
IDEA is generally, but not always, applied to children who
exhibit phenotypic variation, or expressed differences in their

28, 2007).
203. See generally Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and the Practice of
Medicine, 405 NATURE 857 (2000).
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THE POSTGENOMIC ERA 6 (Robert Plomin et al. eds., 2003).
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4).
208. See generally Laura F. Rothstein, Genetic Information in Schools, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALY IN THE GENETIC ERA
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behavior or learning ability.211 Nevertheless, it serves as an
example of why policymakers should not adopt blissful ignorance
or denial of individual variation on any issue without a full
consideration of the consequences and alternatives.
Purging genetic information from all aspects of public and
private life will become an increasingly untenable and counterproductive policy. As I have argued elsewhere, it is seemingly
easier for legislators to enact laws prohibiting access to genetic
information or outlawing genetic discrimination than it is to
address the more fundamental and contentious underlying
issues. 2 12 For example, genetic discrimination in health insurance
is really about access to health care, distributive justice, and
health care finance, all of which most policy makers would prefer
to avoid tackling. At the same time, separate legislative treatment
of genetic information is certain to increase the level of
213
stigmatization of individuals at risk for genetic disorders.
Furthermore, protecting privacy and preventing discrimination
are only two of the many public policies related to obtaining,
using, and disclosing genetic information.
In the pre-genomic age, legal conceptions of equality were
based on the political ideal of equality of rights, the social goal of
equality of opportunity, and the biological fiction of population
homogeneity. In the genomic age, the political foundations and
social aspirations remain the same, but the likelihood of achieving
them will be enhanced by recognizing the biological reality of
individual variation and, in appropriate situations, taking
variation into account in formulating or revising various legal
doctrines. Recognizing genotypic and phenotypic diversity of
individuals is perfectly consistent with respecting and valuing
every individual. It is also consistent with improving individual
and population health, protecting health privacy, ensuring equal
access to health care and other social goods, and guaranteeing civil
rights.
Many members of the public, no doubt influenced by the
initial public pronouncements of the need to suppress genetic
information, are likely to be suspicious of any effort to reconsider

211. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (defining a child with a disability under IDEA).
212. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Privacy and Confidentiality: Why
They Are So Hard to Protect, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 203 (1998).
213. See Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and "FutureDiaries:"Is
Genetic Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC
SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, supra

note 208, at 62.
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the current approach of attempting to limit the uses and
disclosures of genetic information. Accordingly, the following
principles should be core elements of any proposals for the law to
consider individual genetic variation. First, with the exception of
criminal law applications and court-ordered testing, individuals
should have the option of choosing to be tested and learning their
relevant genotypic information. This option, often expressed as
"the right not to know,"214 is illustrated by the earlier example of
voluntary, preplacement genetic testing for susceptibility to
hazardous substances in the workplace.
Second, information generated by a voluntary genetic test
should be used only for the benefit of the individual.
Nondiscrimination laws in various fields, including employment
and health insurance, need to be broad enough to prohibit adverse
treatment based on the inappropriate use of predictive health
information, including predictive genetic information.
Third, comprehensive and vigorously enforced health privacy
and confidentiality laws need to be enacted to prohibit the
unauthorized access, use, or disclosure of any health information.
It also should be illegal for any individual or entity to use genetic
information obtained for determining individual variation for
unauthorized commercial purposes, such as marketing.
Fourth, in contemplating a society in which there is more
widespread genetic information in print and on broadcast
advertisements, on product warning labels, on pharmaceutical
package inserts, in occupational and environmental health
warnings, and in numerous other settings, it is clear that there
must be a greater focus on public education. A scientifically semiliterate population is not equipped to understand the biological
significance of individual genetic variation or the principles of
probability
underlying
risk
assessment.
Unsophisticated
consumers of genetic services also are vulnerable to manipulation
by unscrupulous entrepreneurs.
Fifth, the introduction of greater information about genetic
variation will be more easily accepted by the public if society
moves closer to realizing the political ideal of equality of rights
and the social goal of equality of opportunity. Genetic information
should not be used to further stratify a population at the same
time that many millions of individuals have no access to health

214. See, e.g., Roberto Andorno, The Right Not to Know: An Automnony Based
Approach, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 435, 435 (2004).
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care. 215 Ironically, improved health care outcomes is the primary
216
goal of genomic research.
Finally, it is essential to remember the historical lesson that
biological determinism and pseudo-scientific theories of individual
and group variation have caused myriad harms. One defense of
slavery in the United States was that slaves had an innate
217
immunity to yellow fever, which plagued whites on plantations.
American xenophobia at the turn of the twentieth century and
Nazi "racial hygiene" and eugenics programs were fueled by the
belief that certain peoples were inherently different in ways that
made them irredeemably
stupid,
evil, unhealthy, and
dangerous. 218 Modern society must embrace scientific insights into
human variation while maintaining its vigilance that new
discoveries should be used humanely and sensitively for the
benefit of all.
Conclusion
This Article proposes a new approach to dealing with the
ever-increasing body of individual genomic information. It
advocates replacing the "sameness" model of equality with a new
conception of equality based on recognizing human genomic
variation and respecting individual differences. In many areas,
legal doctrines should be reconsidered and, where appropriate,
revised to translate new conceptions of equality into public policy.
It remains to be seen whether insights from genomic variation will
influence the political debate about equality along numerous other
dimensions such as race, ethnicity, gender, language, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, and culture.
The Article began by mentioning the work of Theodosius
Dobzhansky. One of his contemporaries, C.S. Lewis, wrote: "Man's
power over nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men
over other men with nature as its instrument."2 19 The development
of new methods of identifying individual genomic variation can
either revolutionize societal conceptions of equality or add yet
215. See
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another basis for perpetuating inequality.
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